Are volatility correlations in financial markets related to Omori
  processes occurring on all scales? by Weber, Philipp et al.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
61
10
93
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  9
 N
ov
 20
06
Are volatility correlations in financial markets related to Omori processes occurring
on all scales?
Philipp Weber1,2, Fengzhong Wang1, Irena Vodenska-Chitkushev1,
Shlomo Havlin1,3 and H. Eugene Stanley1
1Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
2Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik, Universita¨t zu Ko¨ln, 50937 Ko¨ln, Germany and
3Minerva Center and Department of Physics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel
(Dated: October 12, 2018)
We analyze the memory in volatility by studying volatility return intervals, defined as the time
between two consecutive fluctuations larger than a given threshold, in time periods following stock
market crashes. Such an aftercrash period is characterized by the Omori law, which describes the
decay in the rate of aftershocks of a given size with time t by a power law with exponent close to
1. A shock followed by such a power law decay in the rate is here called Omori process. Studying
several aftercrash time series, we show that the Omori law holds not only after significant market
crashes, but also after “intermediate shocks”. Moreover, we find self-similar features in the volatility.
Specifically, within the aftercrash period there are smaller shocks that themselves constitute Omori
processes on smaller scales, similar to the Omori process after the large crash. We call these smaller
shocks subcrashes, which are followed by their own aftershocks. We also find similar Omori processes
after intermediate crashes in time regimes without a large market crash. By appropriate detrending
we remove the influence of the crashes and subcrashes from the data, and find that this procedure
significantly reduces the memory in the records. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
the memory in volatility is related to Omori processes present on different time scales.
The correlations of stock returns are important for
risk estimation, and can be used for forecasting finan-
cial time series. The absolute value of the return, which
is a measure for volatility, seems to have a memory
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17],
so that a return is more likely to be followed by a re-
turn with similar absolute value, which leads to periods
of large volatility and other periods of small volatility
(called volatility clustering in economics). While the ab-
solute value exhibits long-term correlations decaying like
a power law [18], the correlations of the return itself de-
cay exponentially with a characteristic time scale of 4
minutes [13, 16].
Recent studies [19, 20, 22, 23] reveal more information
about the temporal structure of the volatility time se-
ries by analyzing volatility return intervals, the time be-
tween two consecutive events with volatilities larger than
a given threshold. These return intervals display mem-
ory and volatility clustering, and also scaling properties
for different thresholds, which seem to be universal for
different time scales and markets [19, 20, 22, 23]. This
behavior is similar to what is found in earthquakes [24]
and climate [25, 26]. Rare extreme events like market
crashes constitute a substantial risk for investors, but
these rare events do not provide enough data for reli-
able statistical analysis. Due to the scaling properties,
it is possible to analyze the statistics of return intervals
for different thresholds by studying only the behavior of
small fluctuations occurring very frequently, which have
good statistics.
Lillo and Mantegna found that after a major stock
market crash the rate of volatilities larger than a given
threshold q decreases like a power law with an exponent
close to 1 [27]. This behavior is analogous to the classic
Omori law describing the aftershocks following a large
earthquake [28].
Here, we show that the Omori law holds not only after
significant market crashes, but also after “intermediate
shocks”. Moreover, we find self-similar features in the
volatility. Specifically, within the aftercrash period (char-
acterized by the Omori law) there are smaller shocks that
themselves behave like the Omori law on smaller scales.
We call these shocks subcrashes, which can be considered
as “new crashes on a smaller scale”, followed by their own
aftershocks.
Furthermore, we analyze the memory in volatility re-
turn intervals after large market crashes, and show that
the memory is related to the Omori law. Indeed, if
we perform appropriate detrending, the return intervals
show significantly less memory, but some memory still ex-
ists, independent of the large market crash. We also show
that at least part of this “remaining memory” can be de-
scribed by the self-similar subcrashes: if we remove also
Omori processes due to subcrashes, the memory is further
reduced. We also analyze the memory in the volatility
time series and show that removing the influence of the
major crash and some of its subcrashes reduces the mem-
ory in the dataset. However, some memory still remains
so that these crashes cannot account for the entire mem-
ory, raising the possibility that the “remaining memory”
is due to other subcrashes whose influence was not re-
moved.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I presents
information about the analyzed data. In section II we
show and discuss the mechanism based on Omori pro-
cesses on different scales. In section III we study the
memory in return intervals induced by large and inter-
mediate shocks. In section IV we analyze the influence of
2crashes on the volatility memory, and section V presents
discussion and conclusions.
I. THE DATA SETS ANALYZED
In order to capture a variety of market crashes, we
analyze three different data sets.
• (i) We study the 1 minute return time series of the
S&P500 index from 1984 to 1989. We analyze the
aftercrash period in the 15,000 trading minutes (ap-
proximately two months) after “Black Monday”, 19
October 1987, as well as after a smaller crash on 11
September 1986. We also analyze the time after
several other smaller market crashes within the en-
tire data set.
• (ii) The second data set consists of the TAQ data
base of the year 1997 which is provided by the
NYSE and contains all trades and quotes for all
stocks traded at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. We
choose the 100 most frequently traded stocks and
calculate an index by a summation of the normal-
ized prices of each stock (normalized by the price).
From this index, we calculate a 1 minute return
time series for our analysis, which we analyze in
the approximately two months after the crash on
27 October 1997.
• (iii) As an example of a crash that is clearly due
to an external event, we also study the 1 minute
return series of General Electric (GE) stock in the
three months after 11 September 2001.
For all three data sets, we calculate the volatility as
the absolute value of the 1 minute return, normalized by
the standard deviation σ of the entire period. Hence,
in this paper the volatility and also the threshold q are
measured in units of the standard deviation σ.
II. OMORI LAW ON DIFFERENT SCALES
Lillo and Mantegna [27] showed that the Omori law
[28] for earthquakes also holds after crashes of large mag-
nitude in financial markets, so that the rate n(t) of events
with volatility larger than a given threshold q decays as
a power law
n(t) = kt−Ω , (1)
where Ω is around 1 for large q and k is a parameter
characterizing the amplitude of the rate n(t). For esti-
mating the parameter k and the exponent Ω, we use the
cumulative number N(t) of events larger than q, given
by
N(t) =
∫ t
0
n(t′)dt′ = k
1
1− Ω
t1−Ω . (2)
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Comparison between volatility and
the cumulative rate N(t) of volatilities (absolute 1 minute
returns) larger than a threshold q. The plots show the 15,000
minutes (approximately two months) after the market crashes
on (a) 11 September 1986, with q = 3, (b) 19 October 1987,
with q = 4, and (c) 27 October 27 1997, with q = 4. The
volatility is displayed as a moving average over 60 minutes in
order to suppress insignificant fluctuations. The insets show
the self-similarity of the data set meaning that while the big
crash in the beginning introduces a behavior following the
Omori law, some of the aftershocks introduce again a similar
behavior on a smaller scale.
3We study the Omori law on different time scales. Fig. 1
shows the cumulative rate N(t) above (a) q = 3 and (b,c)
q = 4 compared to the volatility in time periods follow-
ing three significant market crashes in (a) 1986, (b) 1987,
and (c) 1997. The volatility is smoothed by a moving av-
erage over 60 minutes in order to remove insignificant
fluctuations. The large shock in the beginning of the
time interval is followed by aftershocks, which induces an
Omori-like behaviour of N(t) (Omori process), shown by
the dashed lines representing a power law fit. However, as
seen in Fig. 1 (see insets) many of these aftershocks seem
to behave like “real” crashes with their own aftershocks
(subcrashes), but on a smaller scale (shown by vertical
lines). The insets show that a closer look into many of
these subcrashes reveals a similar pattern as the Omori
law on large scales. The exponent Ω is often smaller after
smaller crashes, which is consistent with the finding that
the power law decay of the volatility after smaller shocks
has a smaller exponent than after large crashes [30]. Be-
low we explore the possibility that the self-similarity of
the volatility (where the Omori law is present on different
scales) is directly related to the memory.
III. RETURN INTERVAL MEMORY AFTER
CRASHES AND SUBCRASHES
In order to explore the memory effects of the Omori
law, we first analyze time periods after very large market
crashes. Specifically, we study the memory in the volatil-
ity return intervals, which form a sequence of time inter-
vals τ(t) between two consecutive events with volatili-
ties larger than a given threshold q [19, 20, 22, 23]. We
next show that the influence of the Omori law on τ(t)
can be estimated by comparing the original τ(t) with a
detrended time series τ˜ (t) which is independent of the
market crash. We fit the cumulative rate N(t) in the pe-
riod after a market crash with a power law according to
Eq. (2), thus obtaining the parameter k and the exponent
Ω for the rate n(t) [27]. Using n(t), we can detrend the
return interval time series τ(t) by rescaling by n(t) [32]
τ˜ (t) = τ(t)n(t) . (3)
The rational for this detrending is the following: imme-
diately after the crash we have a large rate n(t) of high
volatilities so that the return intervals τ(t) are very short.
Later, the rate of high volatilites becomes small while
the return intervals get large. According to Eq. (3), high
(low) rates and small (large) return intervals cancel each
other so that τ˜ (t) is detrended and thus independent of
the existence of the crash, since the trend caused by the
crash is no longer present.
The relation between the Omori law and the short-
term memory in the return interval time series can be
studied by analyzing the conditional expectation value
〈τ(t)|τ0〉 of the return interval series τ(t) conditioned on
the previous return interval τ0 [19, 20], for both the orig-
inal return intervals τ(t) and the detrended time series
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Memory in volatility return intervals
for different thresholds before (left column) and after (right
column) detrending the time series according to Eq. (3). The
analysis is shown for (a) the S&P500 index in the two months
after the crash on 19 October 1987 and (b) an index calculated
from the 100 most frequently traded stocks from the TAQ
data base after the crash of 27 October 1997. Removing the
Omori law reduces the memory in the data sets, but some
memory still exists.
τ˜(t). In Fig. 2 (left column), 〈τ(t)|τ0〉 is plotted against
τ0. Both quantities are normalized by the average return
interval 〈τ〉, for return intervals after the crashes in (a)
October 1987 and (b) October 1997. The deviations from
a horizontal line at 1 for all thresholds show memory:
large (small) values of τ0 are more likely to be followed
by large (small) values of τ(t). The slopes of the curves
for the detrended time series τ˜ are significantly less steep
(right column), indicating that detrending the Omori law
from the time series significantly reduces the memory, but
some of the memory still remains, which might be due
to the Omori process still present on smaller scales (see
Fig. 1).
In addition to the effect of the major crash, we can
also analyze the influence of Omori processes after sub-
crashes on smaller scales. To this end, we further detrend
the time series by removing some subcrashes and test
whether the memory is further reduced. After identify-
ing the subcrashes, [21] we detrend the return intervals
τ(t) by removing the Omori process due to the major
crash as well as the Omori processes induced by the sub-
crashes. To this end, we estimate the parameters k and
Ω in Eq. (1) for the rate n(t) after the major crash as well
as for the rate ns(t) in the 1000 minutes following each
subcrash (or the time to the next subcrash, if smaller).
Note that ns(t) is calculated from the detrended return
intervals τ˜(t). Then, the double detrended return inter-
val time series is given by
˜˜τ (t) =
{
ns(t)τ˜ (t) in time following a subcrash
τ˜ (t) otherwise.
(4)
In order to improve the statistics for testing the effect
of removing also subcrashes on the memory, we plot in
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Memory in volatility return intervals
for threshold q = 3 for (a) the S&P500 index in the two
months after the crash on 19 October 1987 and (b) for an
index calculated from the 100 most frequently traded stocks
from the TAQ data base after the crash of 27 October 1997.
The conditional expectation value 〈τ |τ0〉 / 〈τ 〉 conditioned on
the previous return interval τ0 is smaller than 1 if τ0 is below
the median while 〈τ |τ0〉 / 〈τ 〉 > 1 if τ0 is above the median,
indicating the memory in the records (circles). The effect
gradually weakens upon detrending the time series by remov-
ing the influence of the major crash (squares) and even further
when removing some subcrashes (diamonds).
Fig. 3 the conditional expectation value 〈τ |τ0〉 / 〈τ〉 for
only two τ0 intervals: τ0 below and τ0 above the median
of τ . We see in Fig. 3 that when τ0 is below the median,
〈τ |τ0〉 / 〈τ〉 < 1, while 〈τ |τ0〉 / 〈τ〉 > 1 for τ0 above the
median. This indicates the memory in the records, and
also shows that the memory in the original records (cir-
cles) gradually weakens upon detrending the time series
by removing the influence of the major crash (squares)
and further weakens when also some subcrashes are re-
moved (diamonds). Hence, not only a large market crash
but also smaller subcrashes contribute to the memory in
return intervals.
To further investigate the effect of removing the mem-
ory induced by aftershocks, we analyze the probability
P (t) that after an event larger than a certain volatility
q the next volatility larger than q appears within a time
t [22, 24, 26]. In order to study the memory, we plot
the conditional probability P (t|τ0) for different values of
the preceding return interval τ0. Fig. 4 shows P (t|τ0) for
q = 2 under the condition that the preceding return in-
terval τ−0 belongs to the the smallest 25% of the return
intervals or that the preceding return interval τ+0 belongs
to the largest 25%. The memory in the time series leads
to a splitting of the curves because after larger return in-
tervals (squares) the time to the next volatility above q is
usually large, while it is short after small return intervals
0.1
1
P(
t|τ 0
+
 −
)
τ0 original data
τ0 original data
τ0 detrended
τ0 detrended
0.01 0.1 1 10
t / <τ>
0.1
0.1 1 10
(a) S&P 500 1986
(b) S&P 500 1987
(c) 100 stocks 1997 (d) GE stock 2001
+
+
-
-
FIG. 4: (Color online) Probability P (t|τ0) that after a return
interval τ0 the next volatility larger than a threshold q = 4
(q = 3 in (d)) occurs within time t. Here, τ0 belongs to either
the 25% smallest values (τ−0 , circles) or the 25% largest values
(τ+0 , squares) of τ . The memory in the original time series
(filled symbols) is reduced by detrending according to Eq. (3)
(open symbols), but some of the memory still remains. The
results are shown for (a) the S&P500 index after a crash on
11 September 1986, (b) the S&P500 index after the crash on
19 October 1987, (c) an index created from the 100 most fre-
quently traded stocks from the TAQ database after the crash
on 27 October 1997 and (d) GE stock after 11 September
2001.
(circles). After detrending the time series the curves get
closer, indicating a reduced memory, but also here some
memory still remains.
To test the long-term memory effects of the Omori
process on the volatility return intervals we study the
autocorrelation function shown in Fig. 5 for return in-
tervals after the market crashes in 1987 and 1997 for
two different thresholds q = 1 and q = 2. For both
thresholds, we see that there exists a significant correla-
tion even between return intervals 100 steps apart, which
corresponds to approximately 2 to 5 days in 1987 (0.5 to
2 days in 1997) since the average return intervals are
〈τ(q = 1)〉 = 6.33 min and 〈τ(q = 2)〉 = 17.4 min in 1987
and 〈τ(q = 1)〉 = 2.47 min and 〈τ(q = 2)〉 = 7.66 min
in 1997. If we now remove the effect of the Omori pro-
cess due to the market crash by detrending according
to Eq. (3), the memory in the detrended sequence τ˜ is
reduced significantly, as we see in the dashed curves of
Fig. 5. The dotted lines show that removing also the in-
fluence of some subcrashes according to Eq. (4) further
reduces the memory.
So far, we showed indications that within the time pe-
riod after a big crash there might exist smaller crashes
that behave in a similar way. The question arises whether
such subcrashes are only typical after a big crash or
whether they appear in all time periods independent of
the existence of a big crash. To test this, we analyze if
Omori processes exist also for smaller crashes. We study
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Autocorrelation function of the return
interval time series for threshold (a,c) q = 1 and (b,d) q = 2.
The first row (a,b) shows results from the S&P500 index in
the three months after the market crash on October 19, 1987,
while the second row (c,d) results from an index created from
the 100 most frequently traded stocks from the TAQ database
after the crash on 27 October 1997. The Omori law due to the
market crash (original data, solid lines) induces correlations
leading to an offset in the autocorrelation function which is
removed in the detrended τ˜ (dashed lines), but the data still
shows some long-term correlations even after removing the in-
fluence of the Omori law. However, after further detrending
with respect to some subcrashes (dotted line), the autocorre-
lation is further reduced. All lines are smoothed by a moving
average over 10 return intervals.
22 crashes of sizes between 11 and 16 standard devia-
tions in the S&P500 time series from 1984 to 1989. These
crashes are considerably smaller than the huge crashes of
more than 30 standard deviations in a 1 minute interval
studied above. We analyze the cumulative rate N(t) in
the 1000 trading minutes following these smaller crashes.
In order to make different crashes comparable irrespec-
tive of the current trading activity, we normalize the cu-
mulative rate N(t) by N(1000). Fig. 6 shows this nor-
malized rate N(t)/N(1000) averaged over all aftershock
periods [29]. For different thresholds q, N(t)/N(1000)
can be fit with a power law, Eq. (2). The exponent Ω in-
creases with the threshold, but is generally smaller than
the exponents found after very large shocks. Our re-
sults for the rate decay are analogous to volatility studies
[30, 31] where the exponent characterizing the volatility
decay depends on the magnitude of the shock [30]. These
results indicate that relatively small crashes have similar
Omori processes which may lead to memory effects.
IV. MEMORY IN VOLATILITY AFTER
CRASHES AND SUBCRASHES
In the previous sections, we showed that the memory in
return intervals decreases when we remove effects due to
Omori processes. Since the studied return intervals τ(t)
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Cumulative rate N(t) of events larger
than a threshold q averaged over the 1000 minutes after 22
shocks between 11σ and 16σ in the S&P500 one minute time
series of the years 1984 to 1989. The data for each shock
is normalized by N(1000) in order to make different shocks
comparable irrespective of the current trading activity. The
cumulative rate can be well fitted by a power law according
to Eq. (2). The exponent grows from Ω = 0.05 to Ω = 0.45
for q = 1 . . . 6.
are derived from the volatility time series v(t), it would
be interesting to test whether the memory in v(t) is also
affected by Omori processes. Thus, we next analyze the
memory in the volatility time series directly. It is known
that a market crash induces a power law decay of the
approximate form
vPL(t) ≡ v0t
−β (5)
with an exponent β ≈ 0.2 − 0.3 [27, 30]. In order to
study the memory induced by this decay, we compare
the original time series v(t) to a detrended one
v˜(t) ≡
v(t)
vPL(t)
(6)
so that v˜(t) does not depend on the market crash.
We use second order detrended fluctuation analysis
(DFA2) [33, 34] to study the long-term memory in the
volatility [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17]. In DFA2, the deviations F (s) (root mean square
fluctuations) from a second degree polynomial fit of the
profile
y(t) =
t∑
t′=0
v(t′) (7)
as a function of different scales s (time windows) reveal
information about the memory. If F (s) ∼ sα, the auto-
correlation exponent γ of the time series is related to the
exponent α by α = 1− γ/2. For α > 0.5, the time series
is long-range correlated, it is anti-correlated for α < 0.5,
and α = 0.5 indicates no long-range correlations. Fig. 7
shows log(F (s)/s0.5) plotted against log s for 15,000 trad-
ing minutes after three different market crashes of 1986,
1987, and 1997. With no long-term correlations, the
function would be constant, while a positive slope indi-
cates long-term correlations. For all crashes, the original
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Root mean square fluctuation F (s)
obtained by the second order DFA method (DFA2) for the
volatility in the 15000 minutes following market crashes in
(a) the S&P500 index on 11 September 1986 and (b) on 19
October 1987, as well as (c) the market crash on 27 October
1997 for an index created from TAQ-data for 100 stocks. F (s)
is divided by s0.5 to clarify the deviation from uncorrelated
data. Compared to the original volatility v(t) (circles), the
memory is reduced in the detrended records v˜(t) (squares),
and even further after also detrending some subcrashes in
˜˜v(t) (diamonds).
time series (circles) shows an increased slope on large
time scales. After detrending according to Eq. (6) and
replacing v(t′) by v˜(t′) in Eq. (7), the curve (squares)
gets less steep, indicating a reduction of the memory (the
curves are shifted so that they start at the same point).
As described before, there are also subcrashes which
may induce their own power law decay on a smaller scale
– not only in the rate, but also in the volatility. In order
to analyze the memory due to these subcrashes, we fur-
ther detrend the time series and test whether the memory
is reduced even further. To this end, we fit the detrended
volatility v˜(t) in the 1000 minutes following each sub-
crash (or the time to the next subcrash, if shorter) with
a power law v˜PL according to Eq. (5). Then, we further
detrend v˜(t) in these regions using Eq. (6) for v˜(t) instead
of v(t). The DFA2 curve for the double detrended time
series ˜˜v(t) ≡ v˜/v˜PL is shown in Fig. 7. The decrease in
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Autocorrelation function of the volatil-
ity time series after detrending. Compared to the volatility
time series after detrending the major crash (circles), detrend-
ing subcrashes (squares) further reduces the autocorrelations.
The results are shown for (a) the S&P500 index after a crash
on 11 September 1986, (b) the S&P500 index after the crash
on 19 October 1987, (c) an index created from the 100 most
frequently traded stocks from the TAQ database after the
crash on 27 October 1997. The autocorrelation function of
the original volatility time series is not shown because it is not
meaningful as it is dominated by the influence of the market
crash.
the slope shows that the memory is further reduced after
removing the influence of the subcrashes. However, we
clearly see that removing the trends induced by a mar-
ket crash as well as subcrashes only slightly reduces the
memory in the volatility on quite small scales (s < 60
min).
The effect of removing subcrashes on the long-term
correlations of volatility is seen better in Fig. 8. Here, we
compare the autocorrelation functions of the detrended
volatility v˜(t) and the double detrended volatility ˜˜v(t)
after also removing subcrashes. It is seen that generally
the autocorrelation of ˜˜v(t) is smaller than of v˜(t), which
indicates that the Omori processes after subcrashes also
contain some memory.
7V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We find that the volatility exhibits some self-similar
features, meaning that Omori processes exist not only on
very large scales, but a similar behavior is also induced
by less significant shocks in the aftershocks. After a large
market crash, some of the aftershocks can be considered
as subcrashes that initiate Omori processes on a smaller
scale.
We ask the question whether this self-similarity can
be responsible for the memory in volatility return inter-
vals as well as in the memory of the volatility itself. Our
results show that a significant amount of memory is in-
duced by these crashes and subcrashes, which suggests
that a large part of the memory in volatility might be
due to Omori processes on different scales.
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